Last updated: August 31, 2026
The desktop application only ever talks to the domain controller you configure it against, over LDAP/LDAPS. There is no QuietAD server in the loop for the app itself — it doesn't send telemetry, doesn't phone home, and has no network dependency beyond your own DC. The website (quietad.online) is separate infrastructure that only handles licensing and purchases; it never sees anything about your Active Directory environment.
Your license file is signed with Ed25519, a modern public-key signature scheme. The app verifies that signature locally against a public key built into it — a tampered or forged license file fails verification and the app won't activate. The private signing key never leaves the machine used to issue licenses; it's never transmitted anywhere, including to the app itself.
Active Directory itself treats certain attributes and operations as confidential — password resets, new-user password creation, and LAPS password retrieval. AD silently refuses these over a plain LDAP connection even when the account has permission. QuietAD uses an encrypted LDAPS (port 636) connection specifically for these operations, matching what AD itself requires — not an optional extra, a functional requirement.
| Data | Where it goes |
|---|---|
| Saved admin credentials | Encrypted on disk (Fernet/AES) alongside the app. Never transmitted anywhere. |
| Action & usage logs | Written to a shared folder you choose on first run, with automatic local fallback if it's unreachable. Never sent to us. |
| License verification | Fully offline — no network call to check a license is valid. |
| Website account data (email, purchases) | Stored on your own hosting if you're running the OTP-login backend; separate from the desktop app entirely. |
The app has a built-in About / Verify Integrity screen showing a live SHA-256 hash of the running executable. Compare it against the hash we publish to confirm your copy hasn't been modified or tampered with in transit.
This is worth stating plainly: QuietAD has no permissions of its own. It isn't a service account, it doesn't run elevated, and it can't do anything your connecting AD account isn't already authorized to do. Every action — moving an object, resetting a password, enabling an account — goes through Active Directory's own permission and delegation checks, the same as it would if you ran the equivalent command in ADUC or PowerShell.
Concretely: if the account you connect with hasn't been delegated rights over a given OU, Active Directory itself rejects the action — QuietAD has no way to override that, bypass it, or escalate around it. The tool is a UI on top of standard LDAP/LDAPS operations, not a separate trust boundary. Scoping down which OUs a given admin or helpdesk tech can touch is something you already do today via AD delegation; QuietAD's own OU-restriction settings (see the Settings tab) are an additional, optional layer on top of that — they never replace it, and they're not what's actually enforcing permissions. AD's own ACLs are.
QuietAD performs directive changes to Active Directory — moving, disabling, deleting objects, resetting passwords. It's built for trained IT administrators and helpdesk staff who already have appropriate, delegated AD permissions for the objects they're managing — not as a general end-user tool, and not as a way to grant capability someone doesn't already have. Restricting who has access to the app itself, and using the built-in OU-scoping for less senior staff, is your responsibility as the deploying admin.
Found something concerning? Please tell us before disclosing it publicly: support@quietad.online. We'll take it seriously and respond directly.